DISCUSSION PAPER

THE GOALS OF EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

Report commissioned by BEUC
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BEUC, The European Consumer Organisation, has launched the project “Protecting Consumers Freedoms in the Era of Big Data” (2017-2019), which looks at the role of competition law enforcement and policy in shaping fairer and consumer-oriented digital markets in Europe.

In this context, BEUC is currently looking at how the goals of EU competition law inform the enforcement of competition laws in digital markets with the objective of clarifying European intervention benchmarks, in particular concerning:

- Consumer well-being and consumer welfare
- Effective competition structure
- Efficiencies and innovation
- Fairness
- Economic freedom, plurality and democracy
- Market integration

Prof. Ariel Ezrachi (University of Oxford), academic advisor to BEUC, prepared a discussion paper which looks at the EU competition goals emerging from the EU treaties and case-law and suggests how these goals should guide competition enforcement authorities and courts when applying EU competition law in digital markets.

In order to kick-start the discussion on competition law enforcement in digital markets, we invite comments on the paper, and beyond, from competition authorities, academics, practitioners and other interested parties.

In particular, we would welcome comments on the goals of EU competition law and their application to digital markets. Furthermore, we would welcome information on national cases or judgements, which addressed digital markets and technology and in which the authority or courts paid special attention to the different EU goals and values.

Please send your comments and remarks to: competition@beuc.eu

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EU Competition Law Goals and the Digital Economy

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Introduction

The digital economy forms a central driver to future prosperity – delivering waves of innovation, efficiencies and consumer welfare. It has revolutionised business models, products, services, communications and social interactions. Digitalisation has also stimulated a shift in market dynamics, paving the way for the emergence of key platforms, networks and the proliferation of multi-sided markets.

In a rapidly changing economic landscape, the growth and evolution of the digital economy raise competition enforcement challenges at two distinct levels. First, at the practical level, enforcers must confront the added complexity of conducting their assessments in a dynamic environment. The changing economic landscape brings with it inevitable uncertainty as to the nature of competitive pressures, the ability of markets to self-correct, likely harm, efficiencies, and disruptive innovation. Second, at the policy level, new competition dynamics in the digital economy raise questions as to the normative scope of competition enforcement. The question - ‘Is this a competition problem?’ - has become common in the face of new business strategies, new forms of interaction with consumers, the accumulation of data and the use of big analytics. Indeed, new market realities and business strategies raise questions as to the optimal use of competition law, its effectiveness, and more broadly, its goals.

This paper focuses on the latter challenge and seeks to outline the scope of EU competition law – its purpose and values. While doing so, it considers how EU competition law should be applied to digital markets. Clarifying these norms provides the legal prism through which to view the market dynamics. It affects one’s conclusion as to the nature of activities that competition law can address under European law, and what constitutes an infringement of the law.

The paper begins with a brief introduction of the foundations of European competition law. Following this, it considers the multitude of goals and values that European competition law aims to advance, and their significance in a digitalised economy. The discussion then moves on to explore the tension between the multitude of goals and economic analysis. It then further reflects on the difference in scope between US antitrust law and the limitations of convergence.

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Up-to-date version of this paper, may be found on: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191766
I - Foundations

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the ‘Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ Among other things, the Union’s aim is to promote ‘the well-being of its peoples,’ to ‘establish an internal market,’ promote ‘the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress,’ and ensure ‘an open market economy with free competition.’

Competition policy is one of several instruments used to advance and serve these goals. Protocol No 27, annexed to the EU Treaties, states that ‘the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.’

The EU competition rules have, over the years, been interpreted and clarified through case law and official publications; According to the European Commission, competition on the market is protected ‘as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.’ This notwithstanding, EU competition law has also consistently been held to protect ‘not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.’ Moreover, a genuinely indigenous objective is worthy of note, namely that of promoting European market integration. The European Commission has emphasised the complementary nature of this goal, given that ‘the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers.’

In addition to these core goals, the Treaty-based competition rules – owing to their constitutional nature – must be interpreted in light of the European wider normative values. Indeed, as mandated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘the Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account.’ It so follows that, at the abstract level, Union policies may be implemented by taking into account, among other things,
equality considerations,\textsuperscript{11} consumer protection,\textsuperscript{12} social protection,\textsuperscript{13} public health,\textsuperscript{14} environmental concerns,\textsuperscript{15} investment,\textsuperscript{16} transportation,\textsuperscript{17} and regional development.

The multitude of competition goals, and their position within the wider normative EU values, is undoubtedly challenging, in particular when considered alongside the desire to engage in economic based analysis. As will be explained further below, to the most part, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission have developed the core goals of EU competition law in a consistent manner, utilising economic analysis to optimise intervention within the boundaries set by the Treaty provisions.

\textbf{II – Key Competition Goals and Values}

This section outlines the key goals and values of European Competition law – its unique DNA. The objectives, together, represent the ethos of competition law in Europe. As alluded above, this diversity is not without challenge or controversy. The various goals have not always been clearly outlined. They represent an amalgamation of values which often overlap but may also reveal friction. Indeed, their implementation calls for trade-offs between norms and may result in varying balancing points and ambiguity.\textsuperscript{18} It is with this pluralism in mind that this section seeks to highlight the complementary and interdependent nature of many of these goals and values, and the way in which they form a coherent whole.

The goals of European Competition law centre around, and are primarily consistent, with consumer welfare, but are not limited to it. Without attempting to imply a hierarchy between the other values and goals, this multitude is illustrated below:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Art 8 TFEU.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Art 12 TFEU; Art 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202/389 (hereinafter ‘the Charter’).
\item \textsuperscript{13} Art 9 TFEU refers to ‘the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.’
\item \textsuperscript{14} Art 168(1) TFEU; Article 35 Charter.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Articles 11 TFEU; Article 37 Charter; Julian Nowag Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-Movement Laws (Oxford University Press 2016)
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ford/Volkswagen (Case IV/33.814) Commission Decision 93/49/EEC [1993] OJ L 20/14, para 36: ‘In the assessment of this case, the Commission also takes note of the fact that the project constitutes the largest ever single foreign investment in Portugal. It is estimated to lead, inter alia, to the creation of about 5 000 jobs and indirectly create up to another 10000 jobs, as well as attracting other investment in the supply industry. It therefore contributes to the promotion of the harmonious development of the Community and the reduction of regional disparities which is one of the basic aims of the Treaty.’ See also para 23 where it is stated that when considering an exemption under Article 101(3) the Commission took into account these ‘extremely positive effects on the infrastructure and employment in one of the poorest regions in the Community.’
\item \textsuperscript{17} For example, the transport industry was exempted from the application of EU competition law by the Treaty of Rome. See to this effect Lars Gorton, ‘Air Transport and EC Competition Law’ [1997] Fordham Int’l LJ 602, 608.
\end{itemize}
1. Consumer well-being and consumer welfare

The promotion of consumer well-being and the prevention of consumer harm have long been established as the prime goals of competition law. As noted by the General Court:

‘[T]he ultimate purpose of the rules that seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal market is to increase the well-being of consumers... Competition law and competition policy... have an undeniable impact on the specific economic interests of final customers who purchase goods or services.’

The Court of Justice has clarified that consumer well-being may be harmed both directly and indirectly, holding that the competition provisions cover ‘not only those practices that directly cause harm to consumers but also practices that cause consumers harm through their impact on competition.’

The term ‘well-being’, which is referred to in Article 3(1) TEU and in the case law, embodies somewhat abstract normative properties. With this in mind, the European Commission has made use of the term ‘consumer welfare’ and introduced it into the European Jurisprudence. Reflecting on the decision to utilise the term ‘consumer welfare’, Mario Monti, former European Commissioner, commented on it being driven, to some extent, by the desire to more clearly delineate the scope of competition provisions. The overlap between the two terms is evident, as the normative concept of well-being
encompasses the more narrow, economically oriented, concept of consumer welfare. Importantly, while the concept of consumer welfare hints toward a clearer economic benchmark, it does not embody universally agreed properties. Different views exist, as to its scope, measurement and the means to promote it.23 Different views exist, as to its scope, measurement and the means to promote it.24

The European Commission elaborates, in its guidelines, on the role of the consumer welfare standard. In the context of Article 101 TFEU, it notes that ‘[t]he aim of the Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.’25 Similarly, in the context of Article 102 TFEU, the Commission notes that its enforcement activity aims to prevent ‘an adverse impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice.’26

Consumer well-being and welfare provide the core rationale at the heart of European competition law and identify the prime beneficiaries of the competitive process. In an attempt to transform these goals into workable benchmarks, competition authorities have often approximated them through the use of the consumer surplus benchmark.27 Importantly, one should note the potential discrepancy between the abstract goal of well-being, the concept of consumer welfare, and the narrower economic benchmarks of consumer surplus used to approximate them. Being static in nature, the latter may only partially reflect the full spectrum of welfare effects.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the consumer welfare and well-being benchmarks provide a central pillar for intervention in digital markets. They may be used to address exclusionary practices, exploitation, agreements with the object or the effect of restricting competition, and concentrations. Furthermore, they may provide a prism through which one may consider wider effects which may harm consumer interests.

In the context of the digital economy, noteworthy are the following points:

First, the concept of consumer welfare may be used to address welfare effects on multiple groups of customers. As such, it can effectively address multi-sided markets, which characterise many digital markets. As noted by the Commission, ‘the concept of “consumers” encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products covered by the agreement, including producers that use the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers and final consumers, i.e. natural persons who are acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside their trade or profession.’28

Second, a price-centric approach to consumer welfare, may produce a distorted picture of effects. In the digital environment, where the price is often ostensibly free for consumers, quality forms an important dimension of competition. For example, quality degradation of services or product

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25 General Guidelines (n6) para 33.


27 Joseph F Brodley ‘The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress’ [1997] NYU LRev 1020. Note also Orbach (n24)’s comments that surplus is the only realistically applicable benchmark for antitrust purposes because welfare implies the use of general equilibrium models which are highly impracticable.

28 General Guidelines (n6) para 33.
characteristics may result in harm to consumer welfare, despite the absence of price effects. It is likely that the digital landscape will increasingly require enforcers to consider a range of variables that impact on welfare, even when these are not easily quantifiable.

Third, advanced technological developments and changes in business strategies, may give rise to new challenges to consumer welfare. One example concerns the increased use of tracking and third-party tracking services and the effect these have on the concentration of power and ability to exploit consumers. Another example, which has generated lively debate in recent years, concerns degradation of privacy by dominant providers and the impact on consumer welfare.

Fourth, the use of personal data and advanced analytics and the possible impact on consumer welfare, draws attention to the distribution of wealth. Exploitation through profiling, discrimination, use of asymmetric information and asymmetric bargaining powers, may give rise to novel forms of harm that adversely affect consumers and may necessitate intervention.

2. Effective competition structure

In addition to the core focus on consumer welfare, European jurisprudence has emphasised the goal of maintaining an effective competitive structure. While the two goals often overlap, the focus on competition structure provides a supplementary nuanced prism. The European Courts have long held that competition law is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure. In T-Mobile, the Court of Justice elaborated that European competition law is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such. The Court added that a concerted practice may be regarded as having an anti-competitive object even though there is no direct connection between that practice and consumer prices. Similarly, in her opinion in this case, Advocate General Kokott noted that the protection of the structure of the market indirectly also protects consumers ‘because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.’ Likewise, in GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission, the Court of Justice held that Article 101 TFEU ‘aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.’

In Konkurrensværket v TeliaSonera Sverige, the Court highlighted the significance of preventing ‘competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union.’ In line with this approach, the General Court noted in Intel v Commission, that ‘the Commission is not required to prove either direct damage to consumers or a causal link between such damage and the practices at issue in the contested procedures.’

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30 See in particular: ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having abused its market power by inflinging data protection rules’ (02.03.2016) https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.html. On this issue, see amongst others, Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Digital Markets, Data and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law and Data Protection’ [2016] GRUR Int 639. Note that although they are often conflated, data protection and privacy are two distinct rights protected under EU law. See generally Inge Graef, EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility (Kluwer Law International 2016).
32 T-Mobile (n 7), para 38.
33 Ibid.
34 T-Mobile (n 7), Opinion of AG Kokott, para 71.
35 GSK (n 7).
36 Ibid. para 63.
37 TeliaSonera (n 20), para 22.
decision... [Article 102 TFEU] is aimed not only at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure.38

The protection of an ‘effective competition structure’ provides for a wider prism than that reflected by the consumer welfare benchmark. It draws attention to the competitive process as such and has led to the condemnation of conducts that impair genuine undistorted competition.39

In the context of Article 102 TFEU, the protection of the effective competition structure has resulted in the imposition of a special responsibility on dominant firms not to distort competition on the market,40 limit the buyer’s freedom as regards choice of sources of supply, or bar competitors from access to the market.41 In the context of Article 101 TFEU, the protection of the effective competition supports the view that ‘in order to find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice and consumer prices.’42

Flowing from the protection of an ‘effective competition structure’ is the protection of input providers. Article 102 TFEU unambiguously indicates that an unlawful abuse may result from, among other things, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase prices, or other unfair trading conditions. Similarly, Article 101(1) TFEU refers to the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices. In its decisional practice,43 the Commission noted that the purchase price is a fundamental aspect of competitive conduct.44 The focus on the supply side of the market was also noted by Advocate General Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes,45 where he pointed to the fact that buyer cartels may ‘suppress the price of purchased products to below the competitive level, with negative consequences for the supply side of the relevant market.’46 Overall, the explicit reference to purchase prices has served as a backbone to the assertion that European competition law is also concerned with upstream effects.

In the context of the digital economy, the wider prism offered by the protection of an ‘effective competition structure’ has significant implications.

First, it offers an independent mandate for intervention, detached from direct effect on consumers. It enables the competition agency and courts to pre-empt by challenging actions that distort competition on digital markets. This does not necessarily imply more aggressive enforcement, rather a wider, and arguably more effective, consideration of effects on the digital landscape.

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38 Para 105, Case T-286/09 Intel Corp. v Commission
39 In the context of Article 102 TFEU, note the special responsibility on dominant undertakings. See eg Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369, para 105; TeliaSonera (n 20), para 24; CGK (n 7) paras 62–64.
40 Case C-322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 57, holding that the dominant undertaking has a ‘special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market’.
41 In Post Danmark (n 20), para 26, the Court of Justice held that ‘in order to determine whether a dominant undertaking has abused its dominant position by its pricing practices, it is necessary to consider all the circumstances and to examine whether those practices tend to remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom as regards choice of sources of supply, to bar competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting competition’ (case law omitted).
42 T-Mobile (n 7), para 39.
44 Ibid, para 280.
45 Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and others v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes and others [2004] ECR I-2193.
46 AOK Bundesverband (n 45), Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 70. In its judgement, the Court did not address the fixing of input price as such, since it concluded that the sickness funds in question performed an obligation within the framework of the German statutory health insurance scheme. Subsequently, the funds were held not to constitute undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. See AOK Bundesverband (n 45) paras 45–66.
Second, is the focus on the effects online platforms, intermediaries and other economic actors have on the process of competition. Of particular significance is the subrogation of the dominant firm’s economic self-interests to its responsibility not to distort competition. While it is widely accepted that ‘not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition’, unjustified distortions may trigger intervention.

Third, the focus on the competitive process draws attention to the potential use of networks, platforms or data pools as possible barriers to entry or expansion or as a mechanism to raise rivals’ costs. The increased significance of data in shaping markets and influencing their development, highlight it being a relevant parameter in the assessment of markets and possible distortion of competition.

Fourth, ‘effective competition structure’ draws attention to the consideration of choice in the digital world. It may be used to appraise dominant players’ ability to increase friction and use manipulation to limit consumer choice while maintaining a façade of abundance. Similarly, it provides a relevant intervention benchmarks when dominant firms limit access of competitors through tying practices, or reduced interoperability.

Fifth, the consideration of upstream effects could offer a fresh perspective on how bottleneck digital players can impact the viability of input providers through practices that may negatively affect upstream, but also downstream markets and thus end consumers.

Sixth, the focus on the process of competition has a functional role beyond specific violations, as a tool which supports undistorted innovation in digital markets. Competition agencies should look at the effects various strategies may have on the nature and scale of innovation, and the incentives and ability to bring new products, processes and services to the market.

3. Efficiencies and innovation

Efficient allocation of resources for the benefit of consumers is an important facet of competition policy. Indeed, competition law enforcement strives to ensure that ‘markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition between undertakings.’

47 Post Danmark (n 20), para 22.
48 See comments by Isabelle de Silva (French Competition Authority) stating that ‘it’s interesting to see the importance of privacy rules [in] really shaping the way the market is working, and this needs to be taken into account in our competitive analysis’ (4 May 2018 CCR Live: 7th Annual Telecoms, Media & Technology); Also see comments by Margrethe Vestager (European Commissioner for Competition) stating that ‘… Competition law enforcement cannot do the full trick, but neither can regulation because you need a competitive dynamic marketplace. You need innovation that is driven by competition. And this is why I would take such an interest in privacy, also because it shouldn’t be a competitive edge for you that you completely disregard the need of each and every one of us to have privacy.’ (cited by David Brancaccio and Janet Nguyen 'Europe’s top antitrust official: If there’s no regulation, “you have just the laws of the jungle and not the laws of democracy”’ (April 12, 2018) Marketplace.
49 See for example the discussion on choice in search and whether the competitor is indeed ‘a click away’. See Google Search (Shopping) (Case AT.39.740) Commission Decision of 27 June 2017.
51 Note comments by Pierre Larouche and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, 'Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act’ (May 2013). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-020 • https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293141 • accessed 9 May 2018. ‘When Article 102 TFEU is seen against that background, it is sensible to use that provision to try to protect the competitive process as a value in and of itself. If innovation by its nature cannot be predicted by the authorities, and cannot even reliably be produced by the most skilled and focused firms, the best that competition policy can realistically achieve is to maximize the innovation rate by ensuring that potentially innovative firms deploy their efforts.’
52 General Guidelines (n 6), para1; Guidance Paper (n 9) paras 1, 5-7; Vertical Restraints Guidelines (n 9), para 7.
53 Guidance Paper (n 9), para 5.
Although the scope and measurement of efficiency gains may be subjected to varying approaches, a consensus exists as to their central role in the competitive assessment. Efficiencies play a significant role in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In this context, the Commission has stated that the objective of Article 101 TFEU is to protect competition on the market, among other things, as a means of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. The role of efficiencies is also acknowledged under Article 102 TFEU as they may buttress potential justifications for otherwise abusive conduct. Indeed, as clarified by both the Commission and Union Courts, a dominant undertaking may justify conduct leading to foreclosure of competitors ‘on the ground of efficiencies that are sufficient to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely to arise.’ Finally, in its appraisal of concentrations, the Commission also considers substantiated efficiency claims in the overall assessment of the merger. In particular, it examines whether efficiencies would counteract the harmful effects on both competition and consumers which might otherwise result from the transaction.

Promoting economic efficiencies as part of the application of EU competition law echoes the philosophy of neoclassical and neoliberal economics. Importantly, however, while of central significance in EU competition law, efficiency considerations are entwined with the promotion of consumer welfare and conditioned on consumers benefiting from them. As such, they feed of the consumer welfare and wellbeing benchmarks. Such is the case in merger control where efficiencies may be considered, provided they ‘counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers.’ Efficiencies should be substantial and timely, and should, in principle, benefit consumers in those relevant markets where it is otherwise likely that competition concerns would occur. Similarly, under Articles 101(3) and 102 TFEU respectively, ‘consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits,’ and ‘anticompetitive effects may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by efficiencies which also benefit the customers.’

The focus on consumers underscores the distribution ethos of European competition law (discussed further below). The imperative mandating a ‘fair share for consumers’ implies that total efficiency (or total welfare) gives way to, and embodies, consumer welfare and surplus benchmarks. Importantly, this normative position may be at odds with those who favour an antitrust regime which disregards wealth distribution, or those who believe antitrust enforcement should solely promote efficiency.
In the context of the digital economy, of significance has been the treatment of dynamic efficiencies – that is, innovation – which characterise many digital markets. Innovation processes stimulate dynamic markets, enhance consumer welfare, and may help offset otherwise diminishing marginal returns. As a key driver of competition in, but also for markets, innovation should be safeguarded and promoted. Clearly, competition law has a role to play in fostering competition in innovation by supporting the free market system, and by creating conditions conducive to efficiency maximisation, market integrity, and competition on the merits. Ultimately, how one goes about supporting innovation may depend on one’s affinity to either the Schumpeterian, or Arrowian assumption, to the inverted-U relationship model, or other benchmarks.

The challenge for enforcement in the digital age pertains to the difficulties in apprehending dynamic changes. In the digital world, methodological limitations may undermine one’s capacity to clearly identify the effects of certain behaviours on innovation. Given the nature of dynamic efficiencies and the uncertainty surrounding disruptive innovation, whether competition law can provide an effective tool to ensure competition for future markets (innovation for markets) remains unclear. Also challenging is the ability to differentiate between pro-consumer and negative innovation. Indeed, in a digitalised environment, the distinction between research and development that promotes the consumer interest, from innovation that is used to develop exploitative technology or harmful exclusionary effects becomes, at times, blurred.

The unpredictable nature of innovation calls for cautious intervention. The scope of markets and products, existing and potential competition, the nature of competition, as well as the likely future players may change with new waves of innovation. This dynamism supports the protection of the competitive process (discussed above) as an independent value, for the sake of, and focus on, innovation and future efficiencies.

In the case of merger review, the risk that ex-ante intervention may chill innovation has led some to call for a more laissez-faire approach. On the other hand, risks associated with large networks, data pools, platforms and their impact on competing innovators, adjacent markets, market entry, elimination of potential competition and the tipping of the market in favour of the merged entity, have led others to call for greater scrutiny.

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67 According to the Schumpeterian hypothesis market concentration is understood to allow internalization of the rewards flowing from innovation efforts (increase monopoly rents). It therefore supports “creative destruction” – that is, the dynamic process in which new technologies replace the old. This hypothesis has often been viewed as establishing a negative correlation between competition and innovation; Josef Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (4th edn, George Allen & Unwin 1954).
68 The Arrowian hypothesis suggests that competitive pressure forms the key to investment in innovation. This dynamism supports the protection of the competitive process (discussed above) as an independent value, for the sake of, and focus on, innovation and future efficiencies.
69 The inverted-U shaped relationship suggests that competitive pressure forms the key to investment in innovation, and that significant market power disincentivizes investment in further innovation. Accordingly, competition is viewed as a necessary pressure since a monopoly would likely under-invest in new technologies (or only invest when it generates additional profits); Kenneth J Arrow, Economic, ‘Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in Richard Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social Factors (NBER Books 1962).
70 The Arrowian hypothesis suggests that competitive pressure forms the key to investment in innovation, and that significant market power disincentivizes investment in further innovation. Accordingly, competition is viewed as a necessary pressure since a monopoly would likely under-invest in new technologies (or only invest when it generates additional profits); Kenneth J Arrow, Economic, ‘Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in Richard Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social Factors (NBER Books 1962).
71 The inverted-U shaped relationship suggests that an increase in competition (from an initial low position) increases the rate of innovation. Competition may increase the incremental profit from innovating (the ‘escape-competition effect’ but may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards (the “Schumpeterian effect”); Philippe Aghion et al, ‘Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship’ [2005] The Quarterly J of Econ 701.
73 Generally speaking, modern economic literature suggests greater alignment with the Arrowian premise for most industries, which expects competition to stimulate innovative activity: Josef Drexler ‘Anti-competitive stumbling stones on the way to a cleaner world: protecting competition in innovation (Thibault Schrepel, ‘Predatory Innovation: The Definite Need for Legal Recognition’ [2017] SMU Sci & Tech LRev.
75 Note on this point the proposal by Thibault Schrepel to introduce a legal category specifically dedicated to anti-competitive effects linked to innovation (Thibault Schrepel, ‘Predatory Innovation: The Definite Need for Legal Recognition’ [2017] SMU Sci & Tech LRev.
77 Alford (n 66), stating that ‘there is a genuine risk of reaching the wrong conclusion.’
4. Fairness

The concept of fairness echoes a moral norm embodied in European Union competition rules. As noted above, the concept of fairness reflects on the interpretation of the concepts of consumer welfare and efficiency benchmarks, and serves to align them. Article 101(3) TFEU expressly refers to the concept of "fair share" as part of the individual exemption mechanism available to otherwise anticompetitive agreements. More specifically, this provision requires the passing-on of overall benefits to compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused by the restriction of competition. Article 102 TFEU stipulates that abuses of market dominance may be borne from, among other things, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices, as well as by other unfair trading conditions.

Fairness considerations have triggered intervention, alongside the consumer welfare value, in some cases involving exploitative prices imposed on consumers. Another example may be found in the analysis of margin squeeze, where the unfairness of the spread between wholesale and retail prices is at issue. Fairness, in this context, may be viewed as ensuring equal opportunities for as efficient competitors and the protection of consumers. It is used to guarantee the legitimate expectations of economic operators and consumers. Importantly, fairness should not be confused with protection of competitors. It is well accepted that the competition dynamic may result in less efficient undertakings being pushed out of the market and losing the contest. The value of fairness is not used to challenge such legitimate competition.

Beyond specific references in the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, fairness also serves as an abstract normative value which is promoted by the competitive process, as well as ensuring a fair result of market outcomes. Fair competition cultivates trust in markets. It also crystallises legitimate expectations of market participants, and as such stimulates competition. As noted by the Commission in its 2015 Report on Competition Policy:

"Healthy competition gives companies fair chances to do business and to achieve their commercial goals, which in turn encourages growth, job creation and prosperity. When companies are able to compete on their own merits, businesses and households benefit from a wide range of good quality, innovative products and services at competitive prices."

[83 General Guidelines (n 6), para 85-86.
78 As noted by the Court in TeliaSonera (n 20), para 34, ‘the unfairness, within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU […] is linked to the very existence of the margin squeeze and not to its precise spread, it is in no way necessary to establish that the wholesale prices for ADSL input services to operators or the retail prices for broadband connection services to end users are in themselves abusive on account of their excessive or predatory nature, as the case may be.’ For a similar holding see also Case T-398/07 Kingdom of Spain v Commission [2008] electronic Report of Cases; Deutsche Telekom (n 31).
80 See for example the court holding in Post Danmark (n 20), para 21, according to which Article 102 TFEU does not ‘seek to ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position should remain on the market.’
81 ‘Healthy and vigorous competition is of fundamental importance to a fair EU economy and society’ (European Commission, ‘Staff working document accompanying the Report on Competition Policy 2016’ SWD (2017) 175 final, 59).
82 See statement made by Commissioner Vestager stating that she is ‘convinced that real and fair competition has a vital role to play, in building the trust we need to make the best of our societies’. (Margrethe Vestager, ‘How competition can build trust in our societies’ TED Talk, New York, 20 September 2017).
In 2016, the Commission opened its Report on Competition Policy, by stating that:

Competition policy has a direct impact on people’s lives, and one of its key features is promoting open markets so that everyone – businesses and citizens – can get a fair share of the benefits of growth.  

The 2016 Report makes reference to the 2016 State of the Union speech by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he stated that ‘a fair playing field also means that in Europe, consumers are protected against cartels and abuses by powerful companies. (…) The Commission watches over this fairness. This is the social side of competition law. And this is what Europe stands for.’

Fairness has also been linked to innovation, as a facilitating norm which ensures a level playing field. For example, Advocate General Bot opined that:

Competition, if it is fair, generally ensures technological progress and improves the qualities of a service or product while ensuring a reduction in costs. It therefore benefits consumers because they can also benefit from products and services of better quality at a better price. In that way competition is a source of progress and development.

In its ‘abstract’ form, fairness is often seen as a guide, rather than a self-sufficient enforcement benchmark. In her Foreword to the 2016 Annual Competition Report, Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner for Competition, noted that: ‘competition policy contributes to shaping a fairer society, where all economic players – large and small – abide by the same rules’ and that ‘in times of globalisation, we also need to ensure that a world of global trade, and global businesses, gives small business and individuals a fair chance.’ Importantly, Commissioner Vestager positioned the value within the overall competition enterprise and noted that while competition rules make markets work more fairly for consumers, unfairness, as such, does not automatically result in a violation of the competition rules. Similarly, Director General Laitenberger noted that ‘[c]ompetition policy and enforcement can and do help instil a sense of fairness and equity in the economy and society at large.’

Furthermore, he opined that the concept of fairness ‘is a way to express the overall goals and benefits of EU competition policy in a more tangible manner. It is not meant as a self-sufficient, generic legal test to be applied in cases. And certainly, the very concept of ‘fairness’ excludes that it substitutes rigorous, fact-based analysis.’

Accordingly, fairness is entwined in the competitive process and may guide the enforcer’s approach. It does not, however, protect the losers of a legitimate competitive process, but rather ensures its

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87 Foreword to the Annual Competition Report 2016.

88 See Margrethe Vestager, ‘Fairness and competition’ (2018) Speech delivered at the GCLC Annual Conference, Brussels, 25 January 2018. This approach resembles comments made in the US by Acting Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse of the US Antitrust Division ‘And Never the Twain Shall Meet? Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement’ (2016) Opening Remarks at 2016 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Washington DC, September 20 2016: ‘The ultimate concern of antitrust law has always been protecting competition at all levels of the economy. Animating the beliefs of ordinary Americans who demand vigorous antitrust enforcement are the value of fairness and the belief that properly functioning competitive markets are themselves fair. To say it another way, competition is fair because it gives a chance to the small business owner to succeed in her business venture, because it delivers lower prices to consumers, and because it drives the innovation that improves products, business processes, and more. Competition among employers to attract workers is fair because it yields higher wages, better benefits, and safer working conditions. In general, competition is fair because it distributes these rewards broadly to participants in the economy. But when companies harm competition – choking off competition or agreeing with rivals not to compete – they infect the economy with unfairness by accumulating power that the few can wield at the expense of the broader American public.’

89 Johannes Laitenberger ‘Remarks delivered at a panel discussion organised by the EU Delegation to Canada on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome’ (2017).

90 Johannes Laitenberger, ‘Remarks delivered at a panel discussion organised by the EU Delegation to Canada on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome’ (2017).
legitimacy. Economic reasoning is therefore fused into the norm of fairness. This notwithstanding, controversy remains as to the point of optimal fusion, with ranging views from enforcers, scholars, and businesses. Whichever stance one takes as to the interface between fairness and efficiency, one must crucially understand that fusion requires a balancing of values. In other words, the enterprise cannot be limited to an unreserved adoption of a norm-neutral economic approach. Doing so would divorce EU competition law from its constitutional roots and norms which include fairness. Non-efficiency objectives would thereby be expunged (rather than balanced with efficiency considerations), under the assumption that economic theory resolves normative concerns. Ultimately, such an approach would substitute democratic control with technocratic control.

Embedded in the concept of fairness is the notion that competition law should be utilised to prevent unfair transfers of wealth. Both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU include provisions which support distribitional justice – targeting unfair selling or buying terms and prices. As illustrated above when discussing the consumer welfare standard, distributive justice arguments – though anchored in the Treaty – are not without controversy. Indeed, some have questioned the wisdom and practicality of using competition law to promote fair distributions of wealth. Such a function is claimed to be better served through taxation, thereby untangling the application of competition law from the need to conduct subjective value judgements.

Another related value which may be woven into the discussion of fairness is that of privacy. Privacy and data protection concerns, as such, are typically regarded as matters falling outside the scope of competition law enforcement and protected through dedicated laws. Yet, the role played by data and privacy in shaping markets increasingly supports their consideration as parameters in the competition assessment. In the context of fairness, this may give rise to concerns regarding possible data and privacy-related activities which have exploitative or exclusionary effects. Noteworthy in this respect is the Bundeskartellamt (The Federal Cartel Office, Germany) investigation against Facebook Inc., for alleged abuse of its dominant position in the market for social networks by imposing onerous conditions with respect to its data collection from users, in violation of data protection provisions. The case is anchored in national regulation and precedents, but nonetheless showcases the link between privacy and the control over data on one hand, and concepts of fairness, exploitation and abuse, on the other hand.

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89 For example, the goal of fairer prices for consumers, can be achieved through increased market competition and efficiencies. See Neelie Kroes, ‘Cutting the price of phone calls – new termination rules’ (2009).
94 Kaplow (n 93) 3.
95 Case C-238/06 Amnef-Equifax [2006] ECR I-11125, para 63: ‘…any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law, they may be resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.’
96 See comments by Isabelle de Silva referred to in note 48 above. See also comments by Margrethe Vestager referred to in note 48 above.
97 See a background information document (<https://bit.ly/2G1Viec> accessed 10 May 2018), the Bundeskartellamt elaborated on its theory of harm: ‘If a dominant company makes the use of its service conditional upon the user granting the company extensive permission to use his or her personal data, this can be taken up by the competition authority as a case of "exploitative business terms". The use of exploitative business terms is a type of exploitative abuse under German competition law. With the provision on exploitative abuses the law aims to protect the opposite market side from being exploited by a dominant company. Such exploitation can take the form of excessive prices (price abuse) or unfair business terms (exploitative business terms). According to the case-law of the German Federal Court of Justice, civil law principles can also be applied to determine whether business terms are exploitative. On principle, any legal principle that aims to protect a contract party in an imbalanced negotiation position can be applied for this purpose. Often, such principles stem from the legislation on unfair contract terms or the German Basic Law. Following the Federal Court of Justice approach, the Bundeskartellamt also applies data protection principles in its assessment of Facebook’s terms and conditions. In this regard, data protection law has the same objective as competition law, which is to protect individuals from having their personal data exploited by the opposite market side…’
98 See comments by Isabelle de Silva referred to in note 48 above. See also comments by Margrethe Vestager referred to in note 48 above.
99 The recently revised Section 18(3a) of the German Competition Act makes direct reference to personal data as a criterion relevant when establishing market power, especially in the case of online platforms and networks. Also note that according to the case-law of the German Federal Court of Justice, civil law principles can be applied to determine whether business terms are exploitative.
In the context of the digital economy, fairness could potentially play an important role.

First, as an abstract norm, it provides a guide to the nature of relations between online platforms, service providers and consumers. It may support intervention in view of unfair market practices, or when confronted with illegitimate transfers of wealth from consumers to service providers.

Second, and more specifically, it may serve to support intervention in cases of discriminatory practices by dominant online providers, especially when these lead to almost-perfect-price-discrimination (first degree price discrimination).

Third, it may be used to justify intervention when misleading information online facilitates or leads to distortion of competition.

Fourth, it may play a role when asymmetric information and asymmetric analytical capacity distort the relationship between users and service providers, and allow the latter to exploit users.

Fifth, it may play a role when data handling, data protection and privacy violations lead to distortions of competition or unfair exploitation.

Sixth, it may be used to establish a certain fiduciary duty which restrains the ability to make use of data and analytics about biases and preferences, or use data for other exploitative or exclusionary purposes.

5. Economic freedom, plurality and democracy

Economic plurality and freedom of choice are inherently linked to the quest for an effective competition structure. They reflect a societal agenda which seeks to promote the general public interest. As noted by the Court of Justice, among other things, competition rules ‘prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest...’

Indeed, a competitive marketplace and freedom of choice are both key to the realisation of the Union’s undergirding democratic values and freedoms. The significance of economic plurality transcends the market economy and may be normatively connected to the broader concern of ensuring a healthy political process, unimpaired by distortions induced by powerful firms. As such, the preservation of economic freedom has been viewed as creating the preconditions for democracy, safeguarding against political and regulatory capture. Indeed, influence, lobbying and capture, so the argument goes, are subject to economies of scale and scope, both of which intensify as market concentration increases. While EU law does not target economic power, nor the political power of large corporations, a competitive landscape helps safeguard the market for ideas against its monopolisation by powerful economic players.

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101 TeliaSonera (n 20), para 22.
105 Adi Ayal ‘The market for bigness: economic power and competition agencies’ duty to curtail it’ (2013) JAE 221; Zingales (n 103).
106 Note for example the blocking of merger between media giants in New Zealand due to a finding that the concentrated media ownership threatened the country’s democracy. See Justice Robert Dobson stating that ‘We consider that it is appropriate to attribute material importance to maintaining media plurality (…) It can claim status as a fundamental value in a modern democratic society (…) The risk is clearly a meaningful one and, if it occurred, it would have major ramifications for the quality of New Zealand democracy’ reported by Eleanor Ainge Roy, ‘New Zealand: merger of two largest print media companies blocked by high court’ The Guardian (19 December 2017).
Similar to the consideration of fairness as an abstract norm, these values would not likely serve as standalone intervention benchmark, yet they embody the European ethos and form part of its moral core. In the context of the digital economy, the value of plurality, democratic values and freedoms may support intervention in case where firms distort markets, information flows, and subsequently impact on consumers’ freedom.

In this respect, noteworthy is one of the hallmarks of the online dystopia – stealth – a feature that pertains to the growing means for targeting unsuspecting users. These include a variety of sophisticated techniques that enable firms to surreptitiously harvest user data, merge off-line and online data, as well as target and manipulate user behaviour and public opinion. Linked to this is the use and direction of individuals to specific echo chambers to reinforce existing or desired viewpoints. The values of plurality and freedom may also draw attention to search engine manipulation effects. Illustrative are ranking biases, search suggestions and search engine manipulation effects which have attracted attention in recent years due to their potentially causal connection with the outcome of certain political elections. Advanced manipulation through filtering and ordering may remain largely undetected. Also illustrative are means used to increase usage of networks and applications through behavioural manipulation.

In an environment increasingly dominated by a handful of leading online gatekeepers, the exercise of power over the design and functionality of the user interface may affect user freedom and perception. Against this backdrop, the ever-old challenge of identifying the point at which such distortions may call for intervention or be treated as abuse of dominant position remains.

6. Market integration

EU competition law is instrumental in achieving the goal of integrating national markets. The Commission has alluded to the economic benefits flowing from market integration, ‘since the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers.’ Market integration considerations naturally affect the scope of illegality and the approach to horizontal and vertical agreements. They draw attention to possible segmentation of the EU-wide market into national monopolies. The Court has held that ‘an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the Treaty’s objective of achieving the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single market.’ In a similar vein, in its pay-TV decision, the European Commission criticised as anticompetitive by object agreements which prohibit or limit cross-border passive sales and grant absolute territorial exclusivity.

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107 For a review of the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘freedom to compete’, see Pinar Akman “The role of “freedom” in EU competition law” [2014] SLS Legal Studies 183.
112 For a review of the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘freedom to compete’, see Pinar Akman “The role of “freedom” in EU competition law” [2014] SLS Legal Studies 183.
113 See to this effect TeliaSonera (n 20), para 20, stating that ‘Article 313 TEU states that the European Union is to establish an internal market, which, in accordance with Protocol No 27 on the internal market and competition, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon [...] is to include a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.’
115 General Guidelines (n 6), para 3; Vertical Restraints Guidelines (n 9), para 7.
116 Case AT.40023 Cross-border access to pay-TV, para 47.
Market integration can be seen through the prism of consumer welfare, as parallel trade is liable to exert pressure on prices, while, on the other hand, the segregation of markets may result in reduced competitive pressure. While the European Courts and the Commission have alluded to the economic nature of market integration, the protection of the internal market may naturally affect the threshold for intervention. This may be noticeable in vertical agreements, licencing, and online sales.

In the context of the digital economy, market integration may, in particular, affect business strategies which limit the use of technology, interchangeability, online access, or freedom of online retailers, and, in doing so, create barriers between Member States. Such, for example, may be the case when:

- Contractual restrictions are used to prevent wholesalers and retailers from selling goods online, to buyers in other Member States.
- Contractual obligations requiring permission for online sales from one Member State to another, are used to discourage exports and reinforce market partitioning.
- Technological specifications are used to reduce or eliminate interchangeability between digital products for the purpose of geo-blocking.
- Warranty restrictions are used to create a de facto separation between national markets and prevent parallel imports.
- Online platforms implement geo-filtering; discriminatory practices aimed at charging different prices from users in different jurisdictions.

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119 GSK (n 7), para 139-140.
120 See for example, Sot. Lelos kai Sia (n 31) paras 53, 55 holding that ‘…parallel exports of medicinal products from a Member State where the prices are low to other Member States in which the prices are higher open up in principle an alternative source of supply to buyers of the medicinal products in those latter States, which necessarily brings some benefits to the final consumer of those products…parallel trade is liable to exert pressure on prices and, consequently, to create financial benefits not only for the social health insurance funds, but equally for the patients concerned…’
121 Note the ongoing investigation in Case AT.40428 Guess; also see, Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique [2011] ECR I-9419, para 46 and contrast with Case C-230/16 Coty Germany [2017] electronic Report of Cases, paras 30-36. See also comments by former competition commissioner Almunia stating that ‘[the] Pierre Fabre ruling underlines the need for a strict application of Single Market imperatives’ (Joaquin Almunia, ‘Competition – What’s in it for consumers?’ 2011).
122 See the ongoing investigation in Case AT.40428 Guess. According to the Commission’s press release (IP/17/1549), ‘[t]he Commission will investigate information indicating that Guess’ distribution agreements may restrict authorised retailers from selling online to consumers or to retailers in other Member States. They may also restrict wholesalers from selling to retailers in other Member States.’
123 Note the ongoing investigation in Case AT.40428 Guess; also see, Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique [2011] ECR I-9419, para 46 and contrast with Case C-230/16 Coty Germany [2017] electronic Report of Cases, paras 30-36. See also comments by former competition commissioner Almunia stating that ‘[the] Pierre Fabre ruling underlines the need for a strict application of Single Market imperatives’ (Joaquin Almunia, ‘Competition – What’s in it for consumers?’ 2011).
124 See for example the ongoing review of sales of PC video games in cases AT.40422 Bandai, AT.40424 Capcom, AT.40413 FocusHome, AT.40414 Koch Media and AT.40420 ZeniMax. According to the Commission’s press release (IP/17/201), the Commission is concerned that selective use of activation keys for the purpose of geo-blocking, could restrict parallel trade within the EU single market.
125 Case C-31/85 ETA Fabriques d’Ébauches [1985] ECR 3933 holding that ‘A guarantee scheme under which a supplier of goods limits the guarantee to falling within its economic and legal context justify the finding that such an agreement is not liable to impair competition.’
126 Note the ongoing investigations involving Meliá Hotels’ agreements with Kuoni (Case AT.40527), REWE (Case AT.40524), Thomas Cook (Case AT.40526) and TUI (Case AT.40525). According to its press release (IP/17/201) ‘[f]ollowing complaints from customers, the Commission is investigating agreements regarding hotel accommodation concluded between the largest European tour operators on the one hand (Kuoni, REWE, Thomas Cook, TUI) and hotels on the other hand (Meliá Hotels). The Commission welcomes hotels developing and introducing innovative pricing mechanisms to maximise room usage but hotels and tour operators cannot discriminate customers on the basis of their location. The agreements in question may contain clauses that discriminate between customers, based on their nationality or country of residence – as a result customers would not be able to see the full hotel availability or book hotel rooms at the best prices.’
III - Economics and Law

As evident from the multitude of goals and values explored, competition law forms an integral part of a polity’s legal, social, and political fabric and ‘cannot be pursued in isolation, as an end in itself, without reference to the legal, economic, political and social context.’

Inevitably, the pluralism of values described above, which underpins EU competition law, may create friction with economic theory to the extent that such theory supports a narrower analytical approach. Indeed, the interface between economics and law has been subjected to considerable public and academic debate.

In this regard, a broad consensus exists as to the crucial role that economics plays in shaping competition enforcement and intervention. It is widely recognised that the centrality of economic analysis provides a valuable prism which helps ensure the compatibility of decision-making with the overall aims of competition. However, controversy remains as to the extent to which economisation may substitute legal norms and lead to the erosion of non-efficiency objectives.

On one hand, some have argued that economic theory should delimit the scope of competition enforcement. Accordingly, ‘the only goal of antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare.’ While the concept of ‘economic welfare’ may carry differential weight, this view of competition enforcement has often led to arguments favouring a narrow utilitarian approach that invariably marginalises other values. Such approach discounts the (sometimes inconsistent) norms advanced in legislation and case law, viewing them as undesirable outcomes of political compromise which should be expunged from antitrust discourse. Conversely, it vaunts the merits of quantifiable economics, as consistent and predictable benchmarks. According to this approach what counts is what is countable. Other values, even if forming part of the EU Treaty or case law, should be discounted at the level of implementation and enforcement.

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127 GSK (n 7), para 61, holding that ‘… an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the Treaty’s objective of achieving the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single market. Thus on a number of occasions the Court has held agreements aimed at partitioning national markets according to national borders or making the interpenetration of national markets more difficult, in particular those aimed at preventing or restricting parallel exports, to be agreements whose object is to restrict competition within the meaning of that article of the Treaty…’

128 Case AT.40023 Cross-border access to pay-TV.


133 As commented by Werden: ‘Every favoured policy is said to promote “consumer welfare” […] [b]ut the superficial consensus on this point masks a deep disagreement about what “consumer welfare” means and especially about what policies best to promote it.’ Werden (n 23) 15.

134 Hyman and Kovacic (n 16), 2167 stating that ‘[i]n many countries, the non-efficiency objectives remain in the statute because their presence is a precondition for a coalition that will support enactment’.
By contrast, others take exception to the supposedly monolithic\textsuperscript{137} and value-free nature of the economic enterprise.\textsuperscript{138} They argue that one should not assume that current economic analysis is free of normative and political influence. A modern economic approach is not the result of inevitable higher powers or accurate science, but the outcome of evolution, and to some extent, selective cultivation driven by interest groups.\textsuperscript{139} According to this view, economics in its current manifestation reflects an ideology, and as such embodies no superior analytical purity over other intervention benchmarks. Furthermore, economic models and theories of harm are often rooted in unrealistic assumptions.\textsuperscript{140} Consequently, economic theory should not eradicate the wider goals of EU competition law, nor should it strip it from its constitutional values and moral norms. The marginalisation of competition law’s societal role, by means of economics, should be opposed. Use of the latter, so the argument goes, should be limited to: (i) assisting enforcers and courts in their assessments and interpretation of the law, (ii) reducing the risk of Type I and Type II errors, and (iii) safeguarding from protectionism or industrial interests.

Different competition agencies and scholars across Europe may well have different views on the optimal balance between law and economics, as well as on the latter’s ability to fully reflect the goals and values of European competition law. This multitude of views is inevitable and not unique to Europe. It may be further subject to transformation as competition policy adjusts over time, constantly attempting to keep pace with new political and global realities, as well as with evolving economic and legal theory.

Importantly, however, as one sets to form her or his view on the optimal balancing point, one ought to remember that one’s ideology, and any subsequent balancing, should take place within the legal framework set by the EU Treaties in accordance with their interpretation in case law. One should not eradicate the democratic foundations of a regime and replace them with technocratic control. This is so, in particular, when considering that the EU’s current constitutional framework is the product of modern negotiation and design and provides a detailed account of the norms advanced by the legislator, and by extension, the people of Europe.

**IV - International context**

While competition laws around the world reflect large degrees of consensus on what competition law is set to achieve, they remain distinct, to the extent that they promote or place emphasis on a range of variegated values. The law and its interpretation are path dependant and rooted in ideology. Indeed, one needs only glance at the global arena to realise that different legal systems advance various goals suited to their respective economic, social and political realities and institutional frameworks.\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore, one may observe differentiated views within jurisdictions as to the roles and values competition regimes should advance, as well as to the adequate scope of enforcement. Moreover, national differences in specific regulations, sector specific rules and exemptions, inevitably impact on the scope and mandate of competition law.\textsuperscript{142}


\textsuperscript{140}Its application on a case-by-case basis may be at times inconsistent, as economic experts may display a tendency to become an advocate for the party by which he was instructed.’ Justice Peter Roth commenting on the diverging views presented by economic experts as part of a hot-tub process conducted in the Streetmap v Google hearing (Streetmap v Google [2016] EWHC 233, para 47).

\textsuperscript{141}Ariel Ezrachi, (n 23).

\textsuperscript{142}In the European context, note the introduction of laws and regulations which affect the digital landscape, including: eCommerce, ePrivacy, Geo Blocking, Online Platforms, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); Note generally the use of bypasses, Ezrachi (n 23).
This reality implies that competition law cannot simply be imported and implanted as if it exists in a vacuum.\textsuperscript{143} Such implantation disregards institutional design, legal framework and amounts to the imposition of values and norms advanced by the exporter. As such, it ignores antitrust being a subcategory of ideology.\textsuperscript{144} International convergence of competition laws, while beneficial, cannot lead to full alignment or to the overriding of national peculiarities.

In this respect, it is interesting to consider the enforcement approach in the US and its relevance to EU competition regime. This is particularly so in light on current debate in the US on the need and desirability of changing the benchmark for antitrust assessment, the efficacy of US antitrust law, and its ability to deal with increased concentration and market power.\textsuperscript{145} This debate stems from the evolution of US antitrust law which has seen it being narrowed in scope over the years,\textsuperscript{146} and the rise of voices which argue in favour of widening the notion of consumer welfare and the realm of US antitrust. The alleged decline in competitiveness of US markets has led to an array of proposals (which range from moderate intervention to condemnation of bigness) and to numerous counter arguments.\textsuperscript{147}

While the US debate is of great interest, it should be distinguished from the situation in the EU where detailed intervention benchmarks are positioned within the wider normative values of the EU Treaties. An attempt to implant the US debate in the European context ignores the positioning and established scope of EU competition law, the EU institutional design, and stable jurisprudence. Furthermore, it mistakenly assumes an international alignment to the US model.

Accordingly, convergence of competition laws simply cannot lead to full alignment and to the implantation of values and goals. In this respect it is interesting to note comments made in early 2018 by Makan Delrahim, US Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Antitrust Division, during his visit to the EU. Delrahim noted the excellent collaboration between the EU and the US: "Today, we stand together in upholding the political consensus regarding the proper use of antitrust law, and we continue to work together to promote consumer welfare in our own jurisdictions and worldwide."\textsuperscript{148} Indeed, the benefits of the close cooperation between the EU and the US cannot be overstated. It helps prevent fragmentation of global markets, reduce system friction and limit populism in decision-making. It supports a more coherent approach on both sides of the Atlantic. Delrahim’s positive statement is welcome, to the extent that it does not assume that such alignment eradicates the EU’s norms and values. Similarly, his comments about the desire that the EU and US will close ‘the gap in the area of unilateral conduct’ or that they have aligned their intervention benchmarks,\textsuperscript{149} should only be understood within the different legal and normative structures. That is, increased analytical assimilation while acknowledging different scope, mandate and goals. Any other reading of these comments implies a worldwide monolithic enforcement standard designed with the US vision at heart. It ignores the political and social foundations of the economic approach currently championed in the US, it reflecting an ideology and being subjected to ongoing evolution. Furthermore, it supports one-\textsuperscript{144} For a view from the US, note for example Robert Pitofsky who stated that ‘[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude political values in interpreting the antitrust laws’ in Robert Pitofsky, ‘The Political Content of Antitrust’ [1979] U PA LRev 1051, 1051 quoted in Waller, (n 104).
\textsuperscript{145} Bork (n 64) 408.
\textsuperscript{146} Note for example the 2017 US Democrats initiative, ‘A Better Deal: Cracking Down on Corporate Monopolies and the Abuse of Economic and Political Power’.
\textsuperscript{147} Maurice E Stucke ‘Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals’ [2012] Boston College LRev 551.
\textsuperscript{149} Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at the College of Europe in Brussels, Belgium (Wednesday, February 21, 2018) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-college-europe-brussels
\textsuperscript{144} ibid.
way convergence rather than a multi-directional journey and in doing so propagates a mirage of purity.\textsuperscript{150}

Understanding of the differences in design, law and values, calls for careful consideration before implanting or accepting intervention benchmarks and eradicating one's own norms and goals. Inevitably, differences in the scope of the law and its goals may impact on the outcome of enforcement actions. Take for example another recent statement from Delrahim, who signalled his comfort with mega mergers between high-tech firms and noted the 'great efficiencies' they deliver.\textsuperscript{151} Undoubtedly, these comments reflect the scope of US antitrust law and current beliefs in the US as to the adequate level of intervention and the desired levels of concentration.\textsuperscript{152} In the EU, one would certainly expect and demand these efficiencies to also play a role in merger review. They may indeed support consolidation, but importantly, under the EU regime, they may also be balanced against wider values and norms which form part of EU competition law.

The same principle would apply in other areas of competition law. For instance, while the approach toward monopolisation in the US and the abuse of dominant position in the EU share similarities, they may, at times, lead to different outcomes. Criticising inconsistent outcomes in abstract, with no regard to the different foundations and goals, is akin to comparing apples and oranges.\textsuperscript{153}

\section*{IV - Concluding Remarks}

This paper set out to clarify the scope of European Union competition law and to expound on the values and goals with which the discipline has been entrusted. In so doing, it pointed to the relevant contact points between competition law and the digital economy – identifying areas which may fall within its jurisdiction.

As evidenced by the preceding discussion, clarifying ‘what is a competition law question?’ under European Union law, leads to a multidimensional answer which reflects the multitude of values and goals of the European Union. The answer to this question feeds from the Treaties and their interpretation by the European Court and the Commission. It reflects a multitude of primarily interdependent and consistent goals which culminate in, but are not limited to, the protection of consumer welfare.

The European discipline, while evolving over the years, has displayed, overall, stable characteristics. The role and tasks entrusted to competition law have been set in the European Treaties since their inception and go beyond a pure efficiency analysis. They have been set within an analytical framework enshrined in provisions such as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which clarify their scope. On the other hand, by its nature, competition law evolves over time and so is the Court’s and Commission’s understanding of its scope. Inherent to the discipline is its evolutionary nature and the lack of sole permanent benchmarks for intervention.

\textsuperscript{150} Ezrachi (n 23) above.


As illustrated, the goals and values advanced by EU competition law provide for a flexible enforcement tool which can be used to address many of the evolving dynamics in digital markets. While many overlap in scope, it is possible to highlight their individual significance in the digital environment.

The consumer welfare benchmark may be used, among other things, to address welfare effects on multiple groups of customers and wealth distribution issues potentially stemming from the use of personal data and advanced analytics. It may capture both price and non-price variables. The latter may include, among other things, quality degradation.

The protection of effective competitive structure may be used, among other things, to address distorting practices, even when consumer effect is not readily present, to protect upstream providers, safeguard innovation in the digital economy, ensure access and consumer choice.

The protection of efficiencies may serve to limit enforcement actions in instances where a practice, agreement or transaction generates valuable innovation in digital markets. Conversely, it may call for intervention when innovation in the digital space is threatened.

Fairness may be used, among other things, as a guide to the nature of relations between online platforms, service providers and consumers. It may be used to target discriminatory practices by online providers, misleading information, exploitative data uses and wealth distribution.

Economic freedom, plurality and democracy may be relevant, among other things, in cases where online providers engage in manipulation, distort markets or information flows, and subsequently impact on plurality and consumers’ freedom.

Market integration may be used, among other things, to address business strategies which limit the use of technology, interchangeability, online access, or freedom of online retailers, and, in doing so, create barriers between Member States.

These goals may be wider than what some may favour. Furthermore, they may embed normative values and flexibility that run against the interests of some groups. Yet, that reality constitutes a reflection of both a unique constitutional process and the societal context in which they operate.

This multitude should not be seen as an invitation for broad and unpredictable discretion. Furthermore, it does not preclude one from arguing in favour of limited intervention, or challenging the use of European competition law in different market settings. Such arguments may often have merit and contribute to the development of European jurisprudence.

The key issue lies in the understanding that these claims (on the desirability of intervention) must be apprehended within the framework of goals. Against this backdrop, one may indeed challenge the wisdom of intervention, the likely chilling effect it may have, or the possible utilisation of other instruments to achieve similar goals. One may, indeed, argue for different weighing of goals and values, challenge the choice of cases, theories of harm, standard of proof or evidence on which a decision is founded. One may, moreover, promote a ‘more economic approach’, or to the same extent, question whether economic analysis provides the ultimate prism through which enforcement of competition law is assessed.155

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154 Note for instance the Guidance Paper (n 9).
155 Spencer Weber Waller ‘The law and economics virus’ [2009] Cardozo LRev 367; also see generally Ezrachi (n 23).
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